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The  most difficult period for budgetary policies since the launch of the euro
2002 and the early part of 2003 has been a difficult period both in terms of actual budgetary
developments and as regards the implementation of the EU framework for fiscal surveillance.
The nominal deficit for the euro area as a whole increased from 1.6% of GDP in 2001 to 2.2%
in 2002 and, according to the latest Commission forecast, it is projected to rise to 2.5% of
GDP in 2003. This aggregate outcome is the result of striking contrasts in the performance
across Member States. By the end of 2002, only six EU countries, including four euro area
countries (accounting for some 18% of euro area output) had achieved budget positions (both
in nominal and cyclically adjusted terms) that met the 'close to balance or in surplus'
requirement of the Stability and Growth Pact, whereas two euro area countries (accounting for
half of the euro area output) had deficits above the 3% of GDP reference value.
The Portuguese authorities succeeded in reducing the nominal deficit from 4.1% of GDP in
2001 to 2.8% in 2002, although very significant challenges remain if the deficit is to remain
below 3% of GDP in 2003 as much of this improvement is due to one-off measures which
have only led to a transitory improvement in the budget balance. A deficit of 3.6% of GDP in
2002 has resulted in Germany being placed in an excessive deficit position: while the
authorities are taking measures aimed at reducing the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit, only
a very limited improvement in nominal terms is expected in 2003 as growth conditions
deteriorate. Despite clear evidence of budgetary slippage emerging in early 2002, the French
authorities did not take corrective measures and a deficit of 3.1% of GDP occurred in 2002
resulting in the excessive deficit procedure being activated. An even higher deficit of 3. 7% of
GDP is forecast by the Commission services for 2003 on the basis of current policies. Large
deficits remain in Italy (2.3% of GDP in 2002 and in 2003) and by 2004 is projected to rise
above the 3% of GDP reference value2: budgetary consolidation efforts in Italy continue to
rely on one-off measures rather than on reforms of a structural nature needed to ensure a
permanent improvement in the budget balance. Deficits have also re-emerged in 2002 in
countries that already had reached balanced budget positions, notably Austria (0.6% of GDP),
the Netherlands (1.1%) and the UK (1.3%).
Higher nominal deficits are only partly due to the economic  cycle
At first sight, these developments compare relatively favourably with previous economic
downturns when deficits reached much higher levels and debt ratios entered rapidly
increasing trajectories. In addition, governments have not pursued fine-tuning policies and
while fiscal policies were slightly looser, monetary conditions have eased thanks mainly to
low real interest rates.
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3However, a closer consideration of underlying budgetary trends reveals that the deterioration
in nominal deficits also results from high and rising cyclically-adjusted deficits in several
countries. This indicates a discretionary loosening of the fiscal stance by some Member States
over the past two years, brought about by a combination of unfunded tax cuts, discretionary
expenditure increases and failures as regards budgetary execution. While the outcome of the
euro area in 2002 was unchanged compared to 2001, it should be noted that the cyclically-
adjusted budget balance for 2001 has recently been revised upwards to 2.1% of GDP from
1.5% of GDP, implying that the deterioration in the underlying budget balance in that year
was considerably worse than earlier estimates showed: moreover, the cyclically-adjusted
budget balance includes the impact of one-off budgetary measures which only have a
transitory effect on budget positions. The deterioration has been particularly pronounced in
Germany (where the CAB increased to 3.2% of GDP in 2002) and France (to 3.3%). In Italy,
it remains high at 2.1% of GDP.
In a medium-term perspective, the latest updates of the stability and convergence programmes
contain a target by most Member States to reach budget positions of 'close to balance or in
surplus' by 2005 or 2006. However, it should be noted that the medium-term targets of
Member States are based on growth assumptions, which in light of developments in recent
months now appear to be optimistic. In countries where large cyclically adjusted deficits
remain, the time frame for reaching the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ objective has been
pushed back to 2006 or 2007: even this date will only be met if additional consolidation
measures are undertaken.
Commission proposals to strengthen the co-ordination of budgetary policies
The deterioration in budget positions has placed considerable stress on the EU’s framework
for fiscal surveillance and three Member States have been placed in excessive deficit
positions. In response to these developments, and in line with a mandate from the Barcelona
European Council conclusions, the Commission  adopted a Communication on strengthening
the co-ordination of budgetary policies.3 It identified a number of shortcomings with the
implementation of the SGP in the first four years of EMU and outlined a strategy based on
Member States reassuming political ownership of the Pact. Inter alia, it called for more
account to be taken of underlying economic conditions when assessing budgetary positions,
an interpretation of compliance with SGP requirements that would (depending on country
specific circumstances) cater for the budgetary impact of reforms that enhance growth and
employment, increasing the emphasis placed on the sustainability of public finances and
outstanding debt positions, and improving the implementation of the SGP including stricter
and more timely recourse to the existing enforcement instruments. At the same time the
Commission adopted proposals to improve the governance of budgetary statistics which
provide the foundations for effective surveillance.
The European Council of March 2003 endorsed key conclusions of the ECOFIN Council
The Spring European Council of March 2003, endorsed a report of the (ECOFIN) Council
which shared many of the Commission’s proposals on strengthening the co-ordination of
budgetary policies. It confirmed that the achievement of a budget position of 'close to balance
or in surplus' is in the economic self-interest of Member States both individually and
collectively. In the short run, it provides room for the automatic stabilisers to operate freely
and cushion the effect of economic shocks; in the medium-run it creates room for budgetary
manoeuvre to either cut taxes or divert expenditures to more productive items such as
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4investment and R&D; in the long-run, compliance will help Member States meet the
budgetary costs of ageing population while securing adequate and accessible pensions and
health care.
In addition to re-stating their commitment to the goal of the SGP, the Council agreed that
compliance with the 'close to balance or in surplus’ requirement should be assessed in
cyclically-adjusted terms with due account taken of one-off budgetary measures which only
have a transitory impact on budget positions. For euro-area countries, agreement was reached
that Member States with deficits should achieve an annual improvement in the cyclically-
adjusted budget deficit of at least 0.5% of GDP until the 'close to balance or in surplus'
requirement is reached. It underlined the need for automatic stabilisers to operate
symmetrically over the economic cycle and the particular importance of avoiding a pro-
cyclical loosening of fiscal policies in good times. The Council also confirmed the importance
of running down public debt at a satisfactory pace towards the 60% of GDP reference value
and that the existing provisions of the Treaty (i.e. the debt criterion of the excessive deficit
procedure) can contribute to achieving this goal.
An opportunity to ensure consistent and transparent budgetary strategies
To ensure that the agreement of the European Council represents a real progress towards a
consistent and transparent implementation of SGP, it is essential that the policy guidelines
endorsed by the European Council, and the specific budgetary commitments given by
Member States in their updated stability and convergence programme, are respected.
To this end, policies adopted at national level need to respect the budgetary goals agreed at
EU level In doing so, budgetary consolidation strategies need to be designed in a way that
tackle, and not exacerbate structural weaknesses leading to slow growth and missed
employment opportunities. This requires careful design as regards the balance between
measures on the revenue and expenditure side, and choices on the composition of public
expenditures. Contrary to what is often argued, the existing framework for budgetary
surveillance can simultaneously achieve a consistent approach that balances the need for
budgetary consolidation, re-igniting the recovery and strengthening growth potential.
Significant  advances have been made in the framework for budgetary surveillance
This year’s report on Public finances in EMU –2003 highlights three areas where substantial
progress has been made in the framework for budgetary surveillance over the past year: (i) the
integration of candidate countries into the EU’s fiscal surveillance framework, (ii) an
increased focus on the sustainability of public finances, and (iii), an improvement in the
governance of budgetary statistics. These advances show that tangible progress can be made
to the benefit of Member States and the EU as whole when there is a political will to do so. It
also shows that framework for budgetary surveillance is capable of evolving in light of
growing experience and new policy challenges.
5Integrating acceding and candidate countries into the EU’s fiscal surveillance framework
With ten countries set to join the EU in 2004, a major policy challenge is to prepare for their
integration into the EU economic policy framework, in particular for budgetary surveillance.
A key requirement has been to develop reliable government accounts and economic forecasts
on a par with existing EU countries. At the same time, the EU surveillance of budgetary
developments needs to develop so that appropriate account is taken of the important structural
and institutional changes underway in accession countries. These are partly due to the
completion of the transition from a command to a market economy and partly due to the
additional effects which EU membership will entail (associated with  the need to upgrade
public infrastructure and the commitment to implement the acquis communautaire).
Clear strides have been taken in recent years, although budgetary data are still neither fully
comparable across countries nor completely in line with EU definitions. Data reported by the
candidate countries and forecasts prepared by the Commission services indicate that
budgetary developments are closely mirroring those in the EU, with nominal and cyclically
adjusted budget deficits in 2002 rising in most countries. Looking ahead to 2003 and 2004,
the Commission forecast of Spring 2003 envisages an improvement in the budgetary balances
of nine countries, with marked deficit reductions forecasted in Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey,
and to a more limited extent in Malta. However, very limited improvements in budget
balances are projected in the Czech Republic, Poland and Cyprus.
An important step to integrate the candidate countries into the existing surveillance process
was completed in November 2002, when the second set of Pre-accession Economic
Programmes (PEPs) submitted by candidate countries were examined. The annual
programmes outline the medium-term policy framework, including public finance objectives
and structural reform priorities, and moreover provide an opportunity for candidate countries
to develop their institutional and analytical capacity. The 2002 updates revealed an improved
effort to develop a consistent and credible medium-term macroeconomic framework, although
further analytical capacity building is called for.
The sustainability of public finances received increased prominence in the assessment of
sustainability and convergence programmes.
Progress has also been made as regards placing increased emphasis on the sustainability of
public finances in the SGP as requested by the 2001 Stockholm European Council. For the
second time, an assessment of the sustainability of public finances was carried out on the
basis of budgetary targets and measures announced in the 2002 updates to stability and
convergence programmes leading to firm policy conclusions by the Council. The policy
conclusions, which are based on quantitative indicators and long-run budgetary projections
prepared by the Economic Policy Committee and national authorities, are worrying.
Even assuming all Member States achieve the budget targets for 2006 set down in their
stability or convergence programmes, there is a risk of unsustainable public finances
emerging in about half of EU Member States, especially Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain,
France, Italy, Austria and Portugal. To ensure sustainable public finances, Member States
with deficits first need to achieve and sustain the SGP goal of budget positions of ‘close to
balance or in surplus’. Furthermore, preliminary estimates by the Commission show that an
additional permanent budgetary adjustment of between 1 and 2 percentage points of GDP is
needed in Member States where the sustainability of public finances is a concern. To close
this financing gap, governments should try to avoid raising taxes (especially on labour), and
concentrate efforts on reducing (in terms of ratio to GDP) age-related expenditure by
reforming of pension and health care systems and/or reducing non-age related primary
spending while increasing employment rates and fostering growth.
6Progress has been made on the governance of budgetary statistics
The quality of economic statistics is crucial to ensure an adequate understanding of the
economic situation and effective policy making. Budgetary statistics are the foundation of the
EU fiscal surveillance tools and their quality has improved considerably over the last decade.
Government accounts are now more reliable, complete, transparent and detailed, and are
published in a much more timely fashion than when the excessive deficit procedure was set
up. However, some weaknesses remain: in several countries, data on government deficit and
debt ratios are not yet as reliable as they should be and are subject to large revisions.
Furthermore, the government accounts of several Member States are not fully transparent, and
there have been problems in terms of their timely submission. These concerns are clearly
amplified with the perspective of enlargement.
To address outstanding challenges, the (ECOFIN) Council recently agreed to implement a
code of best practice.4 From the Member States’ side, this involves increasing the
transparency of government accounts in particular for the lower government subsectors, the
strict respect of deadlines, an overall increase in the data quality, but also a clarification of the
independence statute of the national statistical offices as the main compilers of government
data. The Commission (Eurostat) is aiming at reinforcing its ability to scrutinise the Member
States’ government accounts in more detail, and  accelerating the decision making process for
deciding upon the recording of government transactions. The new steps to compile quarterly
budgetary statistics is a major challenge for statisticians, but also for economists, policy-
makers and budgetary policy analysts that will need to interpret quarterly data with due care,
since these will necessarily be more volatile and perhaps less transparent than annual data.
The Commission role in upgrading the analysis of economic and budgetary policies
In its Communication on strengthening the co-ordination of budgetary policies, the
Commission committed itself to upgrading the analysis of economic and budgetary policies.
To this end, a number of detailed studies are contained in the report Public finances in EMU –
2003 as follows:
 firstly, the report examines the impact of budgetary consolidation on growth. It considers
whether the assertion that budgetary consolidation has a negative impact on output is
always valid, or whether fiscal consolidations in EMU under certain conditions can have a
positive effect on output;
 secondly, and as part of the effort to focus on the quality of public finances, the report
analyses public investment. It examines the reasons why public investment as share of
GDP has fallen in recent decades and whether this is in part due the process of budgetary
consolidation and the development of fiscal rules at EU level. It also analyses the link
between public investment and productivity, and considers the merits and feasibility of
developing specific provisions for public investment within the EU’s framework for
budgetary surveillance; and,
 a third chapter examines various aspects of the challenge facing national authorities in
ensuring sound public finances. It reviews the experience of Member States in using
expenditures rules as an instrument to better manage public finances and improve their
quality. In addition, the chapter examines how the allocation of public finance functions
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7across different levels of governments influences the capacity of Member States to fulfil
their budgetary commitments at EU level. This analysis is a good example of the role of
the Commission in undertaking comparative cross-country analyses that enable Member
States to learn from the experiences and best practices of other countries.
Is fiscal consolidation always contractionary?
While there is a broad consensus among both academics and policy-makers on the need for
fiscal discipline to ensure the smooth functioning of EMU and provide conditions conducive
to growth and employment creation, concerns have been expressed that budgetary
consolidation could have a negative effect on output in the short run. This issue is relevant
given the need for several Member States to reduce large cyclically-adjusted budget deficits,
especially against the current background of slow economic growth.
An empirical analysis of the experiences of EU Member States, however, demonstrates that
roughly half of the episodes of fiscal consolidation undertaken in the past three decades have
been accompanied by an acceleration in economic growth. These findings appear to be
consistent with theories that identify a positive impact of budgetary consolidation on
consumer expectations of lower taxes in the future inducing them to raise their consumption
plans, and/or on business expectations of higher profitability enabling them to raise
investment. Confidence factors may play a more prominent role in the future in light of large
unfunded pension liabilities.
Simulations using the QUEST model confirm that if appropriately designed, budgetary
consolidation can contribute significantly to the goal of Lisbon strategy in terms of raising
output and employment in the medium-term. Budgetary consolidation have a slight
contractionary effect on output in the short run, depending on the composition of the
budgetary adjustment. However, budgetary consolidation has a positive impact on output in
the medium-run if it takes place in the form of expenditure retrenchment rather than tax
increases. Moreover, the effect of budgetary consolidation on output could be reinforced, and
even positive, in the short-run if fiscal consolidation is combined with structural reform of
factor and product markets and accompanied with an accommodating monetary stance.
Indeed, budgetary consolidation often acts as a catalyst for structural reforms.
Public investment
Public investment as a share of GDP has fallen in most industrialised countries in recent
decades. It has been claimed that the budgetary requirements of the Treaty and SGP result in
public investment expenditures being at excessively low levels, and that a sustained growth in
public investment expenditures would improve the EU’s growth potential. However, an
analysis shows that the decline in public investment rates is a long-run tendency that started
already in the 1970’s, and affected all industrialised countries and not just EU Member States.
Declining levels of public investment as a share of GDP have been attributed to factors such
as increased levels of economic development (with developed countries already having a high
stock of physical capital and the emphasis switching towards investment in human capital5)
and the changing boundaries between public and private investment (in part linked to the
process of privatisation). Some of the decline in public investment levels appears to be related
to efforts to consolidate public finances, which was necessary irrespective of EMU. A careful
analysis of the data, however, fails to show any clear-cut link between change in investment
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8ratios and the provisions of the EU’s framework for fiscal surveillance. Indeed public
investment expenditures in many Member States have stopped falling after the beginning of
monetary union.
Public investment can make an important contribution to meet the output and employment
goals of the Lisbon strategy. However, in considering the links between public investment
and growth, it is important to focus on net as opposed to gross investment levels (i.e. taking
account of the depreciation of the existing capital stock) and also the interaction between
trends in public and private investment level. Existing studies reveal that public investment
has a positive impact on output and productivity, although the results are not very strong. This
is explained by the fact that only a fraction of public investment expenditures are devoted to
projects which aim at directly raising productivity (e.g. investment in transport infrastructure),
whereas a significant proportion of public investment is devoted to projects that pursue other
objectives such as environmental protection or redistribution across regions, which have an
indirect contribution to productivity .
The important role of public investment is recognised in the existing framework for budgetary
surveillance: for example, Member States are required to specify planned public investment
levels in their annual updates to stability and convergence programmes and the BEPGs
frequently recommend that an increased share of public expenditures be devoted to productive
items. In brief, the budget balance requirements of Treaty and SGP are compatible with a high
share of public spending being devoted to public investment. The recent Commission
Communication on strengthening the co-ordination of budgetary polices sought to cater for
the budgetary impact of large investment projects while at the same time respecting the
commitment to sound and sustainable public finances6.
Several calls have been made to introduce a so-called golden rule into the SGP, which would
allow governments to borrow to finance investment. However, there are strong theoretical and
practical arguments against its introduction, especially in a framework of multilateral
surveillance such as the SGP. First, a golden rule based on a national accounts system could
lead to a bias in expenditure decisions in favour of physical capital and against spending on
human capital (education, training) or other productive items (health care, R&D) which also
contribute to growth  and employment. Secondly, if applied to gross investment, depending on
the specific design and implementation of the reform, the adoption of a golden rule into the
SGP framework may imply substantially higher deficits, thus compromising the objective of
sustainability of public finances. Finally, the relevant concept for the application of the golden
rule would be net investment. However, it is not always possible to compute reliable,
comparable and timely data on this type of investment.
There is a growing practice of financing public purpose investment projects through public-
private partnerships (PPPs). A large share of the PPPs in the EU finance infrastructure and
supplement public investment.7 The main implication for public finances of choosing PPPs as
opposed to traditional public investment is in fact that of converting up-front fixed
expenditures into a stream of future obligations. This practice has a sound microeconomic
rationale in that it can lead to increased efficiency without compromising public objectives. It
is important however to avoid recourse to PPPs where this is solely motivated by a desire to
bypass budgetary constraints.  by putting capital spending outside government budgets. This
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9could lead to PPP projects which entail higher overall costs, which would not be in line with
the objective of sustainable public finances. Efforts are also required to ensure transparency in
national accounts.
Efforts at national level to meet EU budgetary requirements: expenditure rules and fiscal
relations across different levels of governments
Many Member States in recent years have introduced expenditure rules as a means to improve
the management of their public finances, mostly in the form of ex-ante targets rather than
binding legal obligations. National expenditure rules can enable Member States to meet the
budget balance requirements of the Treaty and SGP by helping them to better control
expenditure items that are subject to overruns. The specific design and the strength of the
enforcement mechanisms are key to their effectiveness. Depending on their design, they can
also contribute to other policy objectives such as avoiding a pro-cyclical loosening of fiscal
policy in good times, and improving the quality of the composition of public spending.
There is a great deal of variety in the design of expenditure rules across EU Member States, as
regards the the types of expenditure covered by a rule, the time frame involved and the
robustness of surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. Preliminary empirical analysis
indicates that the existing expenditure rules have not had a visible impact on trends in public
spending. However, judging compliance with expenditure rules is difficult as in many cases
they cover several years and are subject to revisions. In some countries, expenditure rules are
not ambitious enough and adherence with them is easily reached: in other cases, the rule has
been adjusted or abandoned if it is perceived as being too ambitious. Overall, even a relatively
weak expenditure rule can provide useful guidance and signals to actors involved in the
budgetary process.
The Treaty and SGP requirements are defined in terms of the budget balance of the general
government (i.e. central and local/state governments and social security), although the
specific budget targets in stability and convergence programmes are set by the central
government. The challenge in meeting EU budgetary requirements is therefore affected by the
way in which Member States allocate fiscal functions (both revenues and expenditures) across
different levels of government. This is especially the case in federal countries and the Member
States where local authorities have considerable budgetary autonomy. The contribution of
sub-central authorities to the overall budget position is changing in a number of countries  in
light of efforts to devolve certain public functions to regional/local authorities.
The direct contribution of lower levels of government to the general government deficit is
generally limited since all Member States apply restrictions to local government borrowing:
the exception is Germany, where net borrowing by local and state governments accounts for
nearly half of the general government budget deficit in 2002. However, it should be borne in
mind that de facto central government often have to bear the cost of financing difficulties that
emerge at sub-central level. To help comply with the EU's fiscal rules, the federal Member
States and Italy and Spain have recently introduced arrangements that aim at co-ordinating the
budgetary position across levels of government (usually referred to as national stability pacts).
More experience with the implementation of these arrangements is needed before conclusions
can be drawn on their effectiveness in contributing to the objectives of the EU fiscal
framework. A priori, a strong legal base and enforcement mechanism would be expected to
contribute to the credibility and effectiveness of the arrangements.
The process of decentralising responsibility for some policies raises a second issue in the
context of EMU, namely the operation of automatic stabilisers. Experience shows that in
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general systems are designed to shield sub-national governments from cyclical variations.
However, empirical evidence for the US and Germany suggests some degree of pro-cyclical
behaviour at the level of the States. Further research would be useful to analyse the possible
interaction between fiscal decentralisation and automatic stabilisation and to identify the best
practices to reconcile the process of decentralisation with ensuring sound and sustainable
public finances
